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CAN EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 
CONFIRM ORIGINAL SIN?
John T. Mullen
Christian responses to the developing field of evolutionary psychology tend 
to be defensive, focusing on the task of showing that Christians have not been 
presented with any reason to abandon any central beliefs of the Christian 
faith. A more positive response would seek to show that evolutionary psy­
chology can provide some sort of epistemic support for one or more distinc­
tively Christian doctrines. This paper is an attempt to supply such a response 
by focusing on the distinctively Christian doctrine of original sin, which 
presents itself as an especially likely candidate for support from evolution­
ary psychology. I consider five versions of the doctrine in order of increasing 
content, arguing that all but the last can receive such support. However, in 
order to argue for the fourth version (which includes the doctrine tradition­
ally described as "original guilt"), I enlist the aid of a Molinist understanding 
of divine providence. A consequence of this application of Molinism is that 
God holds us morally accountable, not only for what we actually do, but also 
for what we would do in any non-actual conditions, and that He acts on His 
knowledge of what we would do in such conditions. Because many may find 
this consequence problematic, I also argue that it is both morally acceptable 
and necessary for the perfection of the relationship between God and human 
beings. The last version of original sin that I consider insists that it must be the 
causal product of the first sin of the first human being(s), but I argue that this 
is not a reasonable alternative if original sin is to be equated with behavioral 
tendencies inherited from an evolutionary ancestry.
Most contemporary Christian scholarship regarding the relationship be­
tween the emerging field of evolutionary psychology and the Christian 
faith focuses on potential conflicts between the two. Evolutionary expla­
nations for various ethical or religious beliefs and behaviors are frequently 
evaluated for compatibility with Christian explanations for the same. The 
two explanations may be judged to be in some sense incompatible, thus 
requiring some sort of adjudication. Or it may be argued that an evolu­
tionary explanation can be accepted without thereby acquiring a reason 
to abandon or significantly alter one's distinctively Christian beliefs, de­
spite an abundance of claims to the contrary. But in either case the field 
of evolutionary psychology is viewed as a potential threat to Christian 
faith, and the task is to offer a defense in the face of the threat. All of this 
work is important, necessary, and illuminating. It is understandable and 
perhaps even inevitable that a defensive response should be the first order 
of business, especially in view of the more outlandish and often intemper­
ate anti-religious claims of some evolutionary psychologists. But thus far
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the Christian community has given little to no attention to the ways in 
which evolutionary psychology might offer some sort of epistemic support 
for distinctively Christian doctrines (and thus also for the Christian faith 
itself). I take it that this is an undesirable state of affairs that requires cor­
rection. If there is anything to the old adage that the best defense is a good 
offense, then the Christian community should begin to explore the possi­
bility of finding support for the Christian faith in evolutionary psychology. 
This paper, then, is a preliminary attempt to do just that. Though I will 
focus exclusively on the distinctively Christian doctrine of original sin, I 
certainly do not mean to suggest that the prospects for discovering such 
support relations are limited to that doctrine.
I submit that the doctrine of original sin presents itself immediately as 
an obvious candidate for support from the science of evolutionary psychol­
ogy. Those to whom this claim does not seem obvious are very probably 
conceiving of original sin in one of its more specific and historically con­
troversial forms. And I concede that as one adds content to the doctrine, it 
does indeed become more difficult to see how it can be supported by evo­
lutionary psychology. Indeed, one might think that it becomes so difficult 
as to make it obvious that it is not so supported. Nevertheless, I will shortly 
consider most of the historic versions of original sin in order of increasing 
content, and argue that all but one of them can indeed be rendered more 
epistemically probable upon the addition of evolutionary psychology to 
one's belief structure. It will turn out, perhaps unsurprisingly, that this 
relation of epistemic support depends a great deal on which beliefs are 
already sitting in one's belief structure when one takes up the inquiry.
Let us begin by considering a minimal version of original sin and con­
vincing ourselves that we really ought to be able to support it with the sim­
plest and least controversial consequences of evolutionary psychology:
(OS1) Human beings generally1 inherit at conception a set of conditions 
that make it very likely that they will sin2 when they reach a cer­
tain point of moral maturity.
OS1 is very weak in content. Because it is so weak, it is very easy to see in 
it a deep consonance with an evolutionary inheritance. Christians are very 
frequently admonished, by Scripture, Tradition, and by the many sermons 
they hear, to be ever on their guard against the moral corruption they pos­
sess by nature. We are told that we must never assume that all our natural 
inclinations are morally good and right, but must learn to distinguish the 
good from the bad within ourselves, i.e., even from among our internal in­
clinations. And now our latest science is telling us that we have inherited 
from our ancestors certain behavioral tendencies that lead us to protect 
and serve our own interests at others' expense, to preserve and enhance 
our own reproductive fitness relative to others, etc. As Langdon Gilkey puts 
it, we have "genetic influences that lead us to competitiveness, brutality, 
violence, selfishness, and hedonism."3 And as Keith Ward puts it, "If.. .one 
sees human persons as having become a dominant species by being more 
efficient at replicating, obtaining scarce energy supplies, and eliminat­
ing competitors in the struggle for life, then it is perfectly understand­
able that they should have strong drives to sexuality, possessiveness, and 
aggression. Instead of sin being almost impossible to account for, it may
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seem that it is goodness which now becomes virtually impossible. Lust, 
greed, and aggression are the natural inheritance of every human. How 
then could anyone escape their power?"4 Even popularizations of evolu­
tionary psychology occasionally read like secular sermons, admonishing 
readers to beware lest we be deceived by our evolutionary inheritance into 
mistaking merely selfish impulses for what we really ought to do.5 And, 
perhaps ironically, this close fit between inherited behavioral tendencies 
and moral turpitude was not lost on some important early defenders of 
evolutionary theory. John Stuart Mill, for example, thought it was obvious 
that "if Nature and Man are both the works of a Being of perfect goodness, 
that Being intended Nature as a scheme to be amended, not imitated, by 
Man."6 And even Thomas Huxley, known primarily for his aggressive de­
fense of Darwinism, tells us that "the ethical progress of society depends, 
not on imitating the cosmic process, but in combating it."7 So we seem to 
have very strong intuitive, prima facie reasons to equate some of our inher­
ited behavioral tendencies with that corruption of our natures that we are 
so often exhorted to resist. We should therefore expect that the former can 
serve as some sort of evidence for the latter.
We shall consider stronger versions of original sin in a moment, but 
we have not thus far specified the sort of epistemic support we should 
be seeking. Because I see no need to make this task any more difficult 
than it needs to be, I suggest that we should begin with the weakest of all 
epistemic support relations, what is sometimes called the relevance cri­
terion of confirmation. According to this criterion, a body of evidence, E, 
confirms a hypothesis, H, if and only if one's assessment of the epistemic 
probability of H increases when E is added to one's belief structure. Now 
the epistemic probability of any proposition can only be assessed relative 
to some background set of beliefs (or perhaps knowledge), B. And so the 
criterion for epistemic support that we should have in view is, I suggest, 
the following:
P(H / (E & B)) > P(H / B)
where H is one of the versions of the doctrine of original sin, E is the col­
lective deliverances of the science of evolutionary psychology, and B is 
everything else that one might believe (excluding, of course, H, E, ~H, ~E, 
and anything that entails H or E or ~H or ~E). Because B varies from per­
son to person, this confirmation relation is also person-relative. But there 
is no avoiding that, and it is not problematic. What counts as confirming 
evidence for us depends essentially on whatever else we know or believe. 
We must therefore proceed by assuming that there is enough overlap in 
our background beliefs to enable us to come to rough agreement in our 
assessments of the relevant epistemic probabilities. There is no need here 
to consider stronger criteria of confirmation, because we are now asking 
whether evolutionary biology can lend any sort of epistemic support to 
original sin. The weakest of supports will suffice for that purpose.
In the case of OS1, we may assume that E includes the proposition that 
human beings generally inherit at conception a strong behavioral tendency to 
promote their own welfare at the expense of others. Let us also assume that B 
includes the following propositions: It is almost always sinful (i.e., morally 
wrong) to promote one's own welfare at the expense o f others, and It is very
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unlikely that a strong behavioral tendency will be resisted without exception 
throughout the life o f any human being. If these are granted, then E & B to­
gether entail OS1, and so P(OS1 / (E & B)) = 1. And whatever assessment 
one might make of P(OS1/B), it seems clear that it must be less than 1. 
Hence E confirms OS1. But that was too easy. Versions of original sin as 
weak as OS1 are indeed obviously supported by evolutionary psychology. 
So, let us add a little more content to OS1.
The first way we might strengthen OS1 is to add an inevitability re­
quirement. So consider:
(0 5 2) Human beings generally inherit at conception a set of conditions 
that make it inevitable that they will sin.
I take it that a strong behavioral tendency is the most that we can expect 
from the science of evolutionary psychology, i.e., the inevitability we seek 
is not to be found there. So, in order to preserve the support relation for 
this version of original sin, we must make a corresponding adjustment 
to B. The necessary adjustment is, I submit, quite reasonable. Let us add 
to B the proposition that constant resistance to strong behavioral tendencies 
throughout the life o f a human being requires a level o f attention to one's volition­
al freedom that far exceeds the natural ability of human beings. Then, because 
that which is necessary is missing, it follows that it is inevitable that hu­
man beings who mature to a certain point will sin. Because the suggested 
addition to B is a psychological claim, one might wish that it have empiri­
cal support. Unfortunately, I know of no research that either supports or 
refutes the above modification to B. But if we may rely on introspection in 
this case, I think the above claim is very hard to deny. We are very much 
aware from personal experience how difficult it is to remain attentive to 
our moral freedom to the degree required to ensure that we will remain 
blameless at all times. Nor is it too much to claim that that level of atten­
tion is simply beyond our psychological strength. I think we can agree 
that this is a very reasonable modification, unless someone can refute it 
by empirical research in cognitive psychology. We do indeed have that 
belief in our set of background beliefs, or we will easily acquire it once we 
consider it.8
We may now strengthen OS2 still further by specifying the type of in­
heritance that is supported by evolutionary psychology. It seems clear that 
if the conditions that make sin inevitable for us just are the behavioral 
tendencies we inherit from our evolutionary past, then that inheritance is 
a genetic inheritance. Now the inheritance of original sin through biological 
procreation is also a significant feature of the doctrine of original sin as it 
has been taught in a wide variety of Christian communities for a very long 
time. And so we are now in a position to claim support for the following 
historically affirmed version of original sin:
(053) Human beings generally inherit at conception a set of genetic con­
ditions that make it inevitable that they will sin.
Although no additions to either E or B are necessary here, we should pause 
briefly to anticipate two possible objections that might cause some to be 
reluctant to accept OS3, regardless of how well it might be supported by 
evolutionary psychology.
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First, someone might suppose that original sin, to be acceptable at all 
in the modern world, must be regarded as a purely social phenomenon. 
The idea is that something went wrong culturally at some time in the now- 
inaccessible mists of antiquity, and that a cultural corruption resulted that 
has been propagated to all (or almost all) human beings ever since. If our 
genetic inheritance plays any role at all on this view, it is merely to make 
us compliant and conformable to social norms, especially during our for­
mative years. But the content of the social norms could be anything, and 
they in fact lead us morally astray only because we still suffer the negative 
effects of some catastrophic cultural event many millennia ago. This view 
might be held for a variety of reasons. It might seem attractive to those 
who wish to retain some sort of historicity for the doctrine of the Fall, 
despite having become convinced that the opening chapters of Genesis are 
non-historic (or at least that the Fall narrative there is non-historic). It also 
might seem attractive to those who view redemption in purely social terms, 
and who seek to secure it by effecting social change. However, though the 
historicity question will be considered below, we may effectively ignore 
any general reasons someone might have for holding this view and focus 
our attention on the very strong claim that original sin must be exclusively 
cultural. There is no need to quarrel with the claim that many of the condi­
tions we inherit at conception are social (i.e., cultural) conditions. In fact, 
that much seems very clearly to be so. Nor is there any need to dispute 
the claim that we have genetic predispositions to adopt the cultural norms 
to which we have been predominantly exposed in our formative years. 
Again, that much seems unproblematic, and it may likewise be supported 
by empirical psychological research, evolutionary or otherwise. But it is 
extremely problematic, in the face of contemporary evolutionary biology, 
to deny that there is any genetic component at all in our inherited tenden­
cies to sin. Though it is evident that some of our inherited tendencies to 
sin are cultural, it is equally evident that at least some are genetic. The 
confirmation relation that is presently under consideration, whereby OS3 
is confirmed by evolutionary psychology, can stand as a decisive (in my 
view) argument that some of our inherited tendencies to sin are indeed 
genetic. (Recall that those who are convinced that original sin is a purely 
cultural phenomenon may not simply include that belief in B, because it is 
a denial of the hypothesis under consideration.)9 So if anyone is tempted 
to view original sin as an exclusively cultural phenomenon, then it seems 
to me that the claim of exclusivity should be given up. But this should be 
a small price to pay, given that everything else one might believe about 
inherited cultural norms remains intact.
Second, previous attempts to equate genetic behavioral tendencies 
with some version of original sin have been met with charges of "Gnos­
tic Dualism." The idea has been tainted ever since. In 1976, Donald T. 
Campbell created a stir of sorts when he advanced the quasi-Freudian 
view that original sin is the psychological tension created within us when 
our genetically inherited tendencies lead us in one (morally wrong) di­
rection while our culturally (or socially) inherited tendencies lead us in 
another (morally right) direction.10 By 1993, Philip Hefner had developed 
Campbell's view into a doctrine of salvation as cultural transformation, 
complete with a view of original sin that functioned in a way roughly
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analogous to the more traditional view (or views).11 But Hefner's attempt 
was met immediately by a response from Langdon Gilkey on behalf of 
theological orthodoxy (readers of Gilkey will recognize that this is not 
a customary role for him). In addition to making the cogent point that 
culturally inherited tendencies can frequently be quite perverse, Gilkey 
expressed concern that Hefner had identified bodily existence as the 
source of evil. According to Gilkey, Hefner had "listened too eagerly to 
the siren songs of genetics!"12 In fairness to Hefner, it should be noted 
that he had indeed stressed human freedom as a necessary condition 
for moral responsibility. But regardless of whether Gilkey's concern is 
fair to Hefner, we may set it aside with respect to the present attempt to 
equate our genetic inheritance with original sin. It should be clear that
0 53  says nothing about a necessary connection between embodiment as 
such, and sin. Even if it is true that our bodies supply us with sinful ten­
dencies, it does not follow that all bodies must do so (Jesus is presumably 
a decisive counter-example, though the virgin birth may be necessary 
to ensure this), nor does it follow that all persons with sinful tendencies 
are embodied. We may equate original sin with something we happen to 
inherit genetically, and yet escape the charge of Gnostic Dualism by af­
firming the possibility (and, in at least one case, the actuality) of sinless, 
morally significant, bodily existence. Brief reflection will reveal that OS3 
is consistent with the possibility of such an existence.
Let us now proceed to what is probably the greatest difficulty that 
confronts any attempt to equate genetic inheritance with original sin, 
and which may be the reason for the general reluctance of contemporary 
Christian philosophers to avail themselves of such a simple and obvious 
means of support for a distinctively Christian doctrine. This is the prob­
lem of divine justice, especially when it is coupled with the view that we 
human beings are somehow responsible for our own genetic inheritance. 
And so, consider:
(OS4) Human beings generally inherit at conception a set of genetic con­
ditions that make it inevitable that they will sin, and for which they 
are morally responsible.
0 5 4  adds to OS3 what is sometimes called "original guilt," a doctrine that 
is often associated with the Augustinian tradition. It turns out that it is 
somewhat difficult to catch Augustine himself endorsing OS4 explicitly, 
but that need not deter us. OS4 is an intriguing and widely held view in 
its own right. Many have claimed Scriptural support for it from Psalm 
51, among other texts, coupled with a definition of sinfulness that entails 
moral responsibility. For that reason alone it deserves our attention, even 
if it should turn out that Augustine himself did not really hold it. But it 
also deserves the attention of anyone for whom OS3 seems plausible. That 
is because it is difficult to maintain that we are morally responsible for 
actual sins that are causally traceable to an inherited behavioral tendency, 
without holding that we are also somehow responsible for the tendency 
itself. Note that I did not claim that this was impossible, but merely diffi­
cult. But if OS4 is true, then we are relieved of the need to give an account 
of precisely where moral responsibility enters into the causal chain lead­
ing to our actions. Similarly, if it strikes one as at least questionable that
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God would "stack the deck" against us by making moral obedience so 
very difficult, then one has at least a prima facie reason to consider OS4 se­
riously. If our condition is somehow our own fault, then there is no longer 
any concern that God has unjustly stacked the deck.
But our immediate problem is that we seem to have a defeater for OS4 
no matter how much support it might receive from E according to the 
support relation we have been considering. Almost all of us have, in our 
set of background beliefs B, the belief that it is not possible for any human 
being to be morally responsible for any condition inherited at conception. Let 
us call this belief, R. Since R entails that OS4 is false, it must be excluded 
from the set of background beliefs against which the probability of OS4 
is assessed. Nevertheless, because P(OS4 / R) = 0, we can be sure that the 
addition of E to one's belief structure will not change the overall epistemic 
probability of OS4. The support relation remains, but OS4 itself has been 
utterly defeated. To rescue it, one must find a way to deny R. But R seems 
so intuitively correct.
Nevertheless, I believe that R can be reasonably denied, thereby allow­
ing the epistemic support OS4 receives from E to remain undefeated. To 
argue for this, I will enlist the aid of the "Molinist" view of divine provi­
dence that has been developed for the purpose of explaining the relation­
ship between divine sovereignty and human freedom.13 According to Mo- 
linism, there are contingent truths about what each of us would freely do 
in any given set of circumstances, and God, omniscient as He is, knows 
these truths about us (though He cannot alter them, lest freedom be com­
promised). Thus far then, Molinism has nothing whatever to do with the 
problem of reconciling original sin with evolutionary psychology. Yet, it 
follows from Molinism that God knows what each of us would do if we 
were placed in a set of "garden-like" conditions such as that described 
in Genesis 2 and 3. These are the most favorable conditions imaginable 
for passing an obedience test: no original sin at all, and a very pleasant 
existence. We may then take the Genesis narrative to be, at the very least 
and whatever more it may be, God's way of communicating to each of 
us what we would have done in garden-like conditions. And presumably 
God also knows that He would respond to our disobedience in the same 
way that He responds to the disobedience of Adam and Eve in the biblical 
narrative, i.e., by expelling us into a "fallen" state to live out our lives in a 
"fallen" world (but with the possibility and hope of redemption). But, al­
low me to suggest, if God knows all this, then He is free (in the sense that 
there would be nothing morally amiss in it) to bypass the actual test and 
bring us into existence directly into an already "fallen" world. The process 
by which He might thus bring us into existence might well include an 
inheritance of sinful behavioral tendencies and an environment of selfish 
competitiveness, all of which we must learn to resist and combat as part 
of the process of being redeemed. But because the truths about us that 
God would base all these choices upon are indeed "up to us," we would 
still be morally responsible for the "fallen" condition into which we were 
conceived. And so adding Molinism to one's belief structure allows one to 
expel R from it, and thereby enables evolutionary psychology to remain 
undefeated in its service as epistemic support for a doctrine of original sin 
as strong as OS4.
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A  number of important questions arise at this point, but first it will be 
helpful to view this application of Molinism from another perspective. 
Keith D. Wyma has also noticed that Molinism might be useful for as­
suaging concerns about divine justice in the doctrine of original sin. He 
further notes that Molinism comports very well with what is sometimes 
called the "representational" view of the Fall, and it provides us with 
reasonable interpretations of some difficult Scriptural passages (such as 
Romans 5:12-21). But Wyma stops short, I believe, of drawing out the 
full consequences of Molinism. His excellent and insightful remarks are 
worth quoting at length:
God, in considering whom to create and where and when to place 
them, could make use of [His knowledge of what each of us would 
do in any given state of affairs]. In creating Adam's progeny, God 
could restrict Himself to the set of possible humans who would 
freely have done as Adam did in the circumstances of his tempta­
tion and fall. That is, I propose that the humans who exist, and who 
have existed and who will exist, constitute some subset of those pos­
sible humans who would freely have fallen just as Adam did. Thus, 
Adam's rebellion becomes a kind of paradigm for all of us, since his 
action represents what each of us would have done in his place. In 
him, we all sinned, figuratively speaking.
Because of that, God can justifiably create us in the same state 
to which Adam was putatively condemned. There's no point in 
replaying the Fall over and over to the same result. It's as if God 
said to Himself, "The first scene will always be the same, so let us 
join the action in media res; begin with the second scene, where the 
lives follow their own unique paths." This justification then helps 
to make sense of why our state of original sin traces back to Adam. 
Because we are the ones-who-would-freely-have-acted-as-he-did, 
our relation to Adam allows the punishment his rebellion received 
to be applied to us as well. His action stands in for ours; on account 
of what he did, we too suffer the consequences and share in his 
condemned state.
Moreover, this justification also confers some vindication for 
God's creating us in a state from which we cannot fulfill his moral 
demands. God knows that even if we were created with more per­
fect moral capacities, like Adam's initially, so that we would be fully 
capable of carrying out his moral commands, we still would not do 
so, as Adam did not. Therefore, if we would not obey even if we 
could, God need not ensure that we could. It would be useless over­
development to give us increased moral capacities. For that reason, 
setting the limits to our moral capacities truly does resemble setting 
the boundaries of any of our other abilities; all such limiting falls to 
God's unconstrained, free choice, since it is not a question of moral 
obligation for God.14
Just so. But note that the view of original sin that Wyma has in view here 
is not OS4, but OS3. When he does consider OS4, which he calls the "pre­
dominant view on original sin," he explicitly denies that Molinism can be
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enlisted to justify it, and then goes on to declare that it "needs alteration." 
The alteration he proposes is that original sin should not be regarded as 
"grounds for guilt," but is instead a "state of innocent sinfulness" (emphasis 
his).15 The latter is an extremely awkward locution that should be avoided 
at all costs, but the idea seems to be that "original sin" is a misnomer.16 
Other terms would capture the idea better, and Wyma himself suggests 
"shortfall" as a possible substitute. This leaves Wyma with the task of ex­
plaining how we can be blameworthy for the inevitable consequences of 
the conditions we inherit at conception even though we are not blame­
worthy for inheriting those conditions, and to his credit he goes on to take 
up that task. I am not persuaded that his efforts are successful, but I will 
not join that debate here. Let us focus instead on his reasons for rejecting 
Molinism as a justification for OS4, because if they are found wanting then 
there will be no need to alter OS4.
Wyma's objection to a Molinist defense of OS4 is, I suspect, quite com­
mon. He appeals to our general reluctance to blame others unless they 
have actually committed a sin. He writes:
If it's true that we would have rebelled as Adam did, it's one thing to 
skip giving us his test, but it seems a much farther step to blame us 
for failing it. As an analogy, take one of the unfortunate subjects of 
Stanley Milgram's famous experiments involving authority and elec­
tric shock. Suppose a test subject has displayed willingness to inflict 
extreme pain on the word of an authority. Further suppose this con­
firms that the subject would also have been willing to follow orders 
in carrying out Hitler's genocidal plan in Nazi Germany. Let's say 
then, that it's true of this subject that she would freely have helped to 
commit genocide if her governmental authorities had told her to. Do 
we then blame her for the Nazi atrocities? Does this counterfactual 
concurrence make her guilty of those crimes? No; because although 
she would have committed the acts, she in fact did not. Similarly, it 
seems unjust for us to share Adam's guilt, as only he actually com­
mitted the transgression in question.17
But this is not a good reason to think that God cannot hold us account­
able for what we would do in conditions that are not actual. Wyma is 
subtly asking the wrong questions here. He asks, "Do we then blame her 
for the Nazi atrocities?" Well, of course not, because it is essential to the 
"Nazi atrocities" that they be actions committed by the Nazis who actu­
ally committed them. And so she could not have committed those atrocities, 
although she would have committed her own atrocities. Or again, Wyma 
asks whether she is made guilty of those crimes? No indeed, but we are 
wondering about other crimes, namely, the possible crimes she would have 
committed. If Wyma had asked about actions o f a type similar to that of the 
Nazi atrocities, that would be another matter. But he asks his questions 
about the Nazi atrocities specifically, and then appeals to the very strong 
inclination we all have to give a negative answer to those questions as a 
reason to think that none of us should be blamed in any way for what we 
would do in non-actual conditions. But the latter conclusion does not fol­
low from the mere fact that no one would blame her for the Nazi atrocities.
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So we should ask instead, "Do we blame her for the atrocities she would 
have committed?" And the answer to that is not so obvious. There is an 
ambiguity in the word "blame" here. If we are asking whether we would 
punish her for what she would have done, then the answer is clearly "no," 
we would not. But if we are asking whether we would think less of her in 
a moral sense, then the answer is clearly "yes." Our moral judgments are 
not at all blind to what we think others would do in non-actual conditions, 
though punishment does seem to be a response that is inappropriate for 
us. If we think we know that someone would take a bribe if we were to 
offer it to him, then we do think less of him. And that is a perfectly ap­
propriate response, even though we do not call the police until he actually 
takes a bribe.
Should we then conclude that God will likewise think less of us, but 
that He would also be wrong to punish? No, we should not jump to that 
conclusion either. We must ask why we would not punish even when we 
would render a serious negative moral judgment. Perhaps the difference 
lies in our ignorance, i.e., that we never really know what others would do. 
And since punishment is somehow more serious than merely thinking 
less of people, we are willing to base the latter on our fallible judgments, 
but not the former. If that is correct, then God would be within His rights 
to punish on the basis of counterfactuals, because He is not ignorant (pro­
vided Molinism is true). However, this is not satisfactory. We must also 
account for hypothetical cases in which we do know what others would 
do, for at the very least God could give us this information in such a way 
that we know it is coming from God. But it still seems as if we should not 
punish, even if God were to tell us what others would do. Why is that? Is 
it because it is always wrong for anyone, including God, to punish on the 
basis of counterfactuals? Or does it have more to do with our perceived 
authority to punish? I strongly suspect that it is the latter. We can just as 
easily imagine cases where people commit actual crimes, and yet we have 
the same mixed reaction of thinking less of them while yet being unwill­
ing to punish them. We may want others to punish them, but we would 
not do it ourselves. Why not?
I suggest that our intuitive judgments about whether we would pun­
ish someone or not are based primarily on whether we think we have 
the authority to punish, and we human beings never have anything more 
than delegated authority to punish. Furthermore, the conditions under 
which the authority to punish has been delegated to human beings seem 
to be severely limited. A common view is that only those in the service of 
a legitimate state, parents, and perhaps those whom parents have explic­
itly authorized, may punish for moral wrongdoing, and even then only 
when actual acts of commission or omission come to the attention of the 
one in authority. No human being has ever been granted the authority to 
punish on the basis of counterfactuals. These severe limitations on our 
authority to punish are sufficient, I suggest, to account for our intuitive 
judgments that we would not punish on the basis of counterfactuals. We 
humans have never been granted the authority to punish on the basis of 
counterfactuals, so that is why we think it would be wrong for us to do 
so. But the source of these intuitive judgments is our perception of the 
conditions under which we have been delegated the authority to punish,
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and not some universal moral principle that forbids all punishment on the 
basis of counterfactuals. If there were such a principle, then why would it 
not extend to a prohibition against rendering negative moral judgments as 
well? I can see no reason why it would not. So we should not conclude that 
God, who does not have to have the authority to punish delegated to Him, 
and who does have the requisite knowledge, cannot act in judgment on 
the basis of everything He knows about us. The door is therefore left open 
for a Molinist justification of OS4.18
We might crack that door open just a little wider by thinking briefly 
about what it means to be perfectly reconciled to God. This is, presumably, 
a condition for which all Christians long and hope with great intensity. 
It has also been promised to us by God Himself. But can anyone ever be 
in such a condition if God knows that there are conditions such that we 
would sin if we were placed in them? We have already seen that the rela­
tionship between two persons is damaged when one of them knows that 
the other would sin in a given set of non-actual conditions. There is no 
reason to think that this principle fails if one of the persons is God. Thus 
it seems to follow that the only persons who can be in a perfect relation­
ship with God are those who would not sin in any set of present or future 
conditions.19 But this is, I take it, a description of a completely redeemed 
person. A redemptive process is therefore necessary if there is anything 
about us that damages our relationship to God, and that includes its be­
ing true of us that we would sin in some possible set of future conditions. 
These conditions need not become actual, and we need not be aware that 
we would sin if they were actual. God's knowledge of these truths is alone 
sufficient to damage the relationship and place us in need of redemption. 
And if it were somehow improper for God to act on this knowledge, then 
it would be improper for Him to undertake the task of redeeming us and 
we would remain forever in our unredeemed condition. So we should re­
gard it as a very good thing that God is within His rights to act redemp­
tively on the basis of His knowledge of counterfactuals. If it were not so, 
we could never be redeemed.20
Finally, there is yet another historically prominent version of original 
sin that is worthy of our consideration. However, in this case I do not 
think it is possible to preserve the epistemic support that I have claimed is 
enjoyed by the previous four versions of original sin. Some might wish to 
further strengthen OS4 as follows:
(OS5) Human beings generally inherit at conception a set of genet­
ic conditions that make it inevitable that they will sin, and for 
which they are morally responsible, and which is a causal product 
of the first sin of the first human being(s).
I suspect that one of the motivations for affirming OS5 is a desire to retain 
some historic content to the Fall narrative. However, that is not a good 
reason to affirm OS5. An historic Fall is consistent with OS4 alone (though 
OS4 is also consistent with a non-historic Fall), and there are a variety of 
possible historic scenarios one might construct that would not require one 
to view original sin as the causal product of the first sin of the first hu­
man being(s). I tend to be skeptical of such scenarios, partly because they 
seem bizarre to me, partly because they can be dropped without loss of
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any significant (to me) doctrinal content, and partly because there seems 
to be no way to decide between the possible scenarios one might imagine. 
But in any case, those who are fond of inserting a historic "garden event" 
within the larger flow of evolutionary development are free to do so with­
out thereby committing themselves to OS5.21
But OS5 is destructive of any support for original sin that might be 
forthcoming from evolutionary biology. The reason is that any plausible 
candidate for the first human being will himself/herself have a significant 
evolutionary ancestry from which he/she inherited the very behavioral 
tendencies that we are now equating with original sin. So, he/she is al­
ready in a state of original sin, at conception. So, unless someone can make 
sense of backward causation, it is not possible for original sin to both be 
the sinful tendencies one has inherited from one's evolutionary ancestry 
and simultaneously be the direct causal product of an actual sinful action 
that one has performed.22 Evolutionary biology cannot support OS5 in the 
straightforward and simple way that it can support the weaker versions 
of original sin, even OS4 (provided Molinism is true). Therefore, in the 
absence of a very good reason to prefer OS5 over OS4, the Christian com­
munity should not (by insisting on OS5) cast off the epistemic support 
that evolutionary psychology can supply for the doctrine of original sin. 
Furthermore, OS4 does not seem to require any tampering with any other 
doctrine that is regarded as significant by any prominent Christian com­
munity, past or present.23 And so, I say, we should all settle on OS4.24 But 
this would not be a case of settling for  something that is less than what was 
desired or hoped for, but rather a case of settling on a view that best in­
corporates and integrates all of what seems to be the case from both faith 
(Scripture and Tradition) and reason (our best contemporary science).25
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NOTES
1. The addition of the word "generally" is intended to allow for a small 
number of exceptions. All Christians will of course regard Jesus as an excep­
tion. Some Roman Catholics will add Mary. Those who hold to an historic 
"Fall" will make exceptions of Adam and Eve. Exceptions beyond that are 
rare and even more problematic, but I don't wish to exclude them by fiat. In 
subsequent definitions I shall omit the clause that follows the word "sin," but 
it should be tacitly assumed in those definitions as well. I am intentionally 
leaving vague and unspecified the relevant point of moral maturity, since it 
certainly varies from person to person, and seems to remain vague even in 
the case of a single individual. In formulating this and subsequent definitions 
of original sin, I was helped greatly by Michael C. Rea, "The Metaphysics of 
Original Sin," in D. Zimmerman and P. Van Inwagen, eds., Persons: Human and 
Divine (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), pp. 3l9-56.
2. The word "sin" is used broadly here to refer to any sort of moral 
demerit. It is restricted neither to wrongs directed specially or consciously 
against the person of God, nor to actions and overt behavior, but extends also 
to beliefs, desires, "attitudes," dispositions, and any other states of persons to 
which one might wish to attach moral properties.
3. Langdon Gilkey, “Evolution, Culture, and Sin," Zygon, vol. 30, no. 2 
(June 1995), p. 300.
4. Keith Ward, Religion and Human Nature (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 
1998), p. 163.
5. For one such popular presentation of evolutionary psychology, see 
Robert Wright, The Moral Animal (New York: Random House, 1994). Wright 
is neither a biologist nor a philosopher, but a journalist. One might wonder 
whether a thoroughgoing evolutionary ethical theory leaves any room for 
what we really ought to do. That is a very important question, though we must 
leave it aside for now. Wright writes as if he is entitled to moral categories 
despite his account of their origin. For example, he says that “a good start­
ing point would be to discount moral indignation by about 50 percent or so, 
mindful of its inherent bias, and to be similarly suspicious of moral indiffer­
ence to suffering. We should be especially vigilant in certain situations." (p. 343, 
emphases mine). Or again, “chronically subjecting ourselves to a true and brac­
ing moral scrutiny, and adjusting our behavior accordingly, is not something 
we were designed for. We are potentially moral animals—which is more than 
any other animal can say—but we aren't naturally moral animals. To be moral 
animals, we must realize how thoroughly we aren't" (p. 344, emphases mine).
6. John Stuart Mill, “Nature," first published 1874, reprinted in vol. 10 of 
J. M. Robson, ed., Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto 
Press, 1969), pp. 398-99.
7. Thomas H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni­
versity Press, 1989, first published 1894), p. 83.
8. Certain theological beliefs will also accommodate the inevitability re­
quirement. Consider those who think that some motivations (such as a love 
of God, or a desire to please God, etc.) are necessary conditions for full moral 
rectitude, and that these motivations are not present in human beings “natu­
rally," and that human beings can acquire them only through a special act of 
divine grace. Such people already have a set of background beliefs that pre­
serves the support relation for OS2. This is another case where that which is 
necessary is simply missing, so that we must inevitably “fall short."
9. If another argument is needed, one might point to the apparent fact 
that sin is not easily eradicated simply by placing human beings in positive 
cultural conditions. Indeed, I take it that one of God's reasons for establishing 
a Church (i.e., an organized community of the faithful) on earth is to supply us 
with a morally positive cultural inheritance. But do I really need to convince 
anyone of the difficulties involved? Original sin is definitely not a purely social 
phenomenon.
10. Donald T. Campbell, “On the Conflicts Between Biological and Social 
Evolution and Between Psychology and Moral Tradition," Zygon, vol. 11, no. 3 
(September 1976), pp. 167-208. Note the contrast between Campbell's view of 
“social evolution" and the one expressed in the preceding paragraph. Camp­
bell represents the now-growing group of scholars that views a social moral 
code as a fitness-enhancing trait of a group of organisms. There is now a vast 
literature devoted to group selection theory and its potential to explain both 
ethics and religion. Those who continue to maintain a negative view of cul­
turally inherited behavioral tendencies will find their view loosely validated 
by current work in “meme" theory, where self-propagating (and sometimes 
parasitic) cultural “memes" function as analogues of biological genes.
11. Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion (Min­
neapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993). For Hefner's treatment of original sin in 
particular, and his development of Campbell's view, see chapter 8, “Biological 
Perspectives on Original Sin" (pp. 123-42).
12. Gilkey, “Evolution, Culture, and Sin," p. 306.
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13. The name derives from the sixteenth-century Cardinal Luis de Molina. 
One can make a reasonable case that Augustine and Anselm were Molinists, 
though this is disputed. Recent development of the Molinist position has been 
undertaken by Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Flint, and many others. For a thor­
oughgoing contemporary defense of Molinism, see Thomas P. Flint, Divine 
Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
Molinism remains controversial, but I think I can safely appeal to it as a very 
influential and intuitively satisfying view that enjoys wide support and has 
not been refuted (see also note 22 below). Since the debate about Molinism it­
self is well underway, I shall consider in this paper only those objections to my 
proposed application of Molinism that are not merely objections to Molinism 
itself. This type of objection grants that Molinism is true, but then goes on to 
claim that it cannot be enlisted in any attempt to rescue OS4 from the charge 
that it is inconsistent with divine justice. Keith Wyma offers an objection of 
this sort, which I consider below.
14. Keith D. Wyma, “Innocent Sinfulness, Guilty Sin: Original Sin and Di­
vine Justice," in Peter van Inwagen, ed., Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), pp. 268-69.
15. Ibid., p. 271.
16. This is also the view to which F. R. Tennant came to in one of the first 
attempts to examine the doctrine of original sin in the light of evolutionary 
biology. See F. R. Tennant, The Origin and Propagation of Sin (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1908). According to Tennant, “no natural im­
pulse is itself sinful, unless present through our volition" (p. 104). Since he 
saw no way that the behavioral tendencies we inherit from our evolutionary 
past could be present through our volition, he concluded that such tendencies 
are not sinful in themselves.
17. Wyma, “Innocent Sinfulness, Guilty Sin: Original Sin and Divine Jus­
tice," pp. 270-71.
18. This response to Wyma's objection remains neutral regarding the 
proper goal of punishment. I have said nothing about whether punishment is 
valuable for rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence, or some combination of the 
three, and everything I have said is consistent with any view one might have 
about that.
19. Note that it is not necessary (for being in a perfect relationship with 
God) that there was never a time when it was true of us that we would sin in 
some set of hypothetical conditions. If that were a necessary condition then 
everyone on this planet must forever abandon hope of ever being in a perfect 
relationship with God. Rather, the necessary condition (for being in a perfect 
relationship with God) is merely that there be no present or future time at 
which it is true of us that we would sin in some set of hypothetical conditions.
20. There is a plausible interpretation of Jesus' teaching on adultery in 
Matthew 5:28 that, if correct, would lend considerable Scriptural support to 
the conclusion that it is just to punish on the basis of knowledge of counter- 
factuals. If Jesus is teaching that anyone who would freely commit adultery if 
given the opportunity is in fact guilty of adultery, then the above conclusion 
is strongly reinforced. For this point I am indebted to comments from Michael 
Thune. However, I am not entirely persuaded that this is the correct interpre­
tation of Matthew 5:28.
21. As far as I can tell, the only historic scenarios that would require a rea­
sonable person to commit to OS5 are those that include the following: Prior to 
an actual sin committed at time t no human being had any sinful behavioral 
tendencies at all (i.e., there was no original sin), but after t and because of the 
sin committed at t, all human beings had some sinful behavioral tendencies. 
This scenario is indeed grossly incongruent with any attempt to equate original
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sin with sinful behavioral tendencies inherited from an evolutionary ancestry. 
For the evolutionary process in view naturally confers on any human being 
who is a product of it behavioral tendencies to assert himself/herself at the 
expense of others (i.e., sinful behavioral tendencies). And thus the only way 
there can be a time t at which no human being had any sinful tendencies at all 
is for all human beings to have been miraculously preserved from the ordi­
nary effects of the evolutionary process at all times prior to t. This is logically 
possible of course, but I take it that most reasonable people will simply reject 
the attempt to equate original sin with tendencies inherited from an evolu­
tionary ancestry before they will accept such pervasive (and ad hoc?) miracu­
lous activity on God's part. But it should be noted that the above scenario is an 
extremely restricted one. Even those who insist that some human beings were 
once in an historic state of “original righteousness" can reject it. For one might 
suppose that a given pair of individuals was selected by God for an historic 
test and were for that reason miraculously preserved from original sin (much 
as Jesus Himself may have been through the virgin birth). These individuals 
would then be in a historic state of “original righteousness." After their actual 
sin, they may be somehow altered so as to share in the sinful tendencies of 
their fellow humans (the ones who received their sinful tendencies through 
the ordinary course of evolutionary development). They would then serve as 
representatives of all their fellow humans based on God's knowledge of what 
each individual would do in similar conditions. Though the sinful tendencies 
of the individuals who are historically tested would be the causal product of 
their own actual sins, the sinful tendencies of other human beings would not 
be. And so it is possible to preserve a theologically significant, historic state of 
“original righteousness" for some human beings without accepting OS5. The 
latter scenario is sufficient to show this, regardless of whether one is otherwise 
inclined to accept it, and regardless of whether there are other scenarios that 
are likewise sufficient.
22. Molinism does entail that we have some counterfactual power over the 
past, and thus the Molinist defense of OS4 that I have just recommended can 
also be used to explain how death and suffering can be connected in some way 
to human sin. But counterfactual power over the past is different from direct 
backwards causation, and nowhere near as problematic. Time and space pre­
clude a discussion of the complex issues involved here, but interested read­
ers should consult the recent debate about the merits of Molinism between 
Thomas Flint (pro) and William Hasker (con). Once again, I think I may safely 
maintain that Molinism remains at the very least a viable option, and perhaps 
even the best option.
23. This is important because several authors have claimed that any ad­
equate Christian response to evolutionary biology must include some sort of 
reinterpretation of the doctrine of the atonement. For a moderate example, see 
Keith Ward, Religion and Human Nature, Chapter 9, pp. 186-203. For a more 
radical reinterpretation, see Patricia A. Williams, Doing Without Adam and Eve: 
Sociobiology and Original Sin (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), pp. 182­
97. These reinterpretations of the atonement are held to be necessary because 
we inherit our sinful tendencies from our evolutionary ancestry, and we could 
never be blameworthy or in need of atonement on that basis. But this is just to 
claim that OS4 must be false. I take it that if OS4 can be preserved, there will 
be no reason to reinterpret the doctrine of the atonement (or any other histori­
cally prominent doctrine).
24. Anti-Molinists must of course settle for OS3, but then it will not be so 
easy to avoid any further doctrinal tampering. That is because, once again, it 
is very awkward to think of ourselves as being in need of moral redemption 
if we are in no way responsible for conditions that make it inevitable that we
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will be in need of that redemption. Thus OS3 creates considerable pressure to 
view redemption in a non-moral way. Does this amount to an argument for 
Molinism? That depends on how strongly one prefers OS4 over OS3 and its 
doctrinal consequences. However, one might wonder whether the very fact 
that Molinism can be applied to the problem of original sin in a promising 
and satisfying way (and this much is granted even by Wyma, who rejects OS4 
in favor of OS3) can itself be parlayed into an argument for Molinism. Such 
an argument might appeal to the fact that Molinism was developed for the 
purpose of explaining the relationship between divine providence and human 
freedom, and not for the purpose of reconciling original sin with evolution­
ary biology, or for finding support for the former in the latter, etc. Its useful­
ness in dealing with the latter problems may then be loosely regarded as a 
sort of “novel prediction," often thought by philosophers of science to be a 
very strong epistemic virtue. Any theory that “bears fruit" beyond the original 
stock of facts it was invoked to explain begins to look correct, and Molinism 
may be bearing just that kind of fruit here. But this introduces a line of inquiry 
that must be taken up elsewhere.
25. I am grateful to all the participants of the “Nature in Belief" seminar at 
Calvin College (Summer, 2004) for their help in the research and preparation 
of the first drafts of this paper. I am especially indebted to Jeffrey Schloss and 
David Vanderlaan, both of Westmont College. Likewise, thanks are due to all 
the participants and attendees of the subsequent “Nature in Belief" confer­
ence at Calvin College (November 3-5, 2005), and of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers Midwest Regional Meeting at Notre Dame University (April 20­
22, 2006), for helpful and insightful comments on a later draft of this paper. 
Finally, thanks are due to the editor and referees of this journal for additional 
suggestions that helped make it a better paper.
